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Given the possibility to modify the probability of a loss, will a profit-maximizing insurer engage in
loss prevention or is it in his interest to increase the loss probability? This paper investigates this
question. First, we calculate the expected profit maximizing loss probability within an expected
utility framework. We then use Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2006, 2007) loss aversion model to answer
the same question for the case where consumers have reference-dependent preferences. Largely
independent of the adopted framework, we find that the optimal loss probability is sizable and for
many commonly used parameterizations much closer to 1/2 than to 0. Previous studies have argued
that granting insurers market power may incentivize them to engage in loss prevention activities,
this to the benefit of consumers. Our results show that one should be cautious in doing so because
there are conceivable instances where the insurer’s interests in modifying the loss probability to
against those of consumers.
JEL classification: D11, D42, D81, L12
Keywords: loss modification, expected utility, reference-dependent preferences, insurance.
1 Introduction
An insurer’s profits depend on the amount consumers are willing to pay for protection against a
potential loss in excess of the expected value of the policy, the risk premium. This risk premium in
turn is a function of both the severity of the loss and the probability that a loss happens. It seems only
natural for profit-maximizing insurers to influence either or both of these risk management parameters
whenever possible. Despite this connection, and in sharp contrast to the extensive literature that deals
with the insuree’s incentives to engage in self-protection and self-insurance1, attention for the loss-
modification incentives by insurers has however been very limited.
∗We are particularly grateful to Jeroen Hinloopen and seminar participants at FUR XVI 2014 for their valuable
comments. Views and opinions expressed in this paper as well as all remaining errors are solely those of authors.
†Corresponding author: University of Groningen, EEF, P. O. Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands,
a.r.soetevent@rug.nl.
‡University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam School of Economics, E3.80, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The
Netherlands, l.zhou@uva.nl.
1Starting with Ehrlich and Becker (1972), see Gollier et al. (2013) and the references therein.
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Two notable exceptions are the contributions by Schlesinger and Venezian (1986, 1990) who point
out that insurers often lobby Congress to implement policies aimed at loss prevention (e.g. keep
drunk drivers off the road) or loss reduction (e.g. mandatory airbags and better bumpers on new
automobiles (Schlesinger and Venezian, 1990, p. 84). Within an expected-utility framework with
risk-averse consumers, they formalize the decision problem of a risk-neutral monopolistic insurer who
has the possibility to modify the status-quo loss probability p0. When any loss modification efforts are
costless, the insurer has incentives to invest in loss prevention services prior to any insurance sales2
when the status-quo probability p0 exceeds the profit-maximizing probability p
∗. Because the insurer
always sets the risk premium such that the consumer’s utility when buying insurance is marginally
higher than the expected utility of being uninsured, and because the latter is decreasing in the loss
probability, any reduction in loss probability will unambiguously increase consumer welfare.
On the other hand, in case p0 < p
∗, the interest of the insurer to increase the loss probability
unambiguously goes against those of consumers. It is remarkable that this possibility is rather easily
dismissed by Schlesinger and Venezian as largely irrelevant with the argument that insurers’ initiatives
to purposely increase the loss probability are “likely to meet with public resistance and possible
regulatory restraint” (Schlesinger and Venezian, 1990).3
In our opinion, this view that society provides sufficient checks and balances to prevent insurers
from taking actions against the interest of consumers may prove too optimistic. Whereas insurers’ loss
reduction activities are easy to monitor because they companies are happy to advertise them4, any
efforts made to increase the loss probability may well go unobserved. This holds especially for feasible
but omitted loss-prevention activities. Who for example can tell whether insurers do everything within
their means to increase car safety or to fight obesity? Even when the insurer has no means to raise
the actual loss probability, it may be in his interest to try to increase the subjective loss probability
as perceived by consumers since a successful attempt will have the same effect on his profits.
We therefore believe that the question how likely situations with p∗ > p0 are to occur deserves
further study and exactly this is the aim of this paper. For if these situations are rare, there is not
much reason to worry. If, on the other hand, it is likely that p∗ > p0, one should be careful in giving
2These efforts are non client-specific.
3Schlesinger and Venezian (1986, p. 232) use a similar argument to limit the subsequent analysis (“for the sake of
concreteness”) to the case p∗ < p0.
4For example, insurers provide a variety of loss preventions services to reduce the probability of cars theft
(http://www.aig.co.uk/motor-fleet-loss-control_2538_367524.html) or the number of hospital visits by offering
free gym memberships to increase citizen’s enthusiasm for physical exercises (http://articles.washingtonpost.com/
2012-01-12/politics/35439261_1_gym-membership-medicare-advantage-health-insurance) or by offering free med-
ical check-ups.
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insurers incentives to modify the loss probability. As Schlesinger and Venezian (1990) point out, these
incentives to engage in loss reduction are absent in a competitive market where any (increases in the)
risk premium due to the lower expected loss will be competed away immediately. Any analysis that
ignores the possibility that insurers may desire to increase the loss probability (or the magnitude of
the loss) will therefore too easily reach the conclusion that consumers are better off when insurers are
granted market power.
Whether consumers are better off in an imperfectly or perfectly competitive market thus depends
on: a) the sign of the difference between the optimal and status-quo loss-probability (p∗ and p0),
and b) the magnitude of the risk premium an insurer is able to charge when he has market power.
In a numerical illustration for the case in which consumers’ utility functions are characterized by
identical, constant relative risk aversion (CARA), Schlesinger and Venezian (1990) calculate critical
loss probabilities pc: if p0 > pc (p0 < pc), consumers are – in terms of expected utility – better (worse)
off in a market with a loss probability p∗ and a monopolistically priced policy than in a competitive
market where insurance is sold at the actuarial value of the policy (that is, at the expected loss p0L,
with a zero risk premium). Their results show that as long at the initial loss probability p0 ≤ 1/2,
consumers in this economy are never better off in a monopolistic insurance market.
The current paper extends the numerical analysis in Schlesinger and Venezian (1990) by considering
a richer variety of consumer risk preferences to identify the value of the optimal loss probability p∗
in these alternative economies and keeping in mind that the higher p∗, the less likely it is that the
(unobserved) initial loss probability p0 will exceed p
∗. Within the expected utility framework, we
distinguish between the situation case where consumers face absolute risks and the case where the
risks are proportional to their wealth. Health risks are mostly independent of one’s wealth and therefore
an example of the former, home insurance an example of the latter since more wealthy people tend to
live in more valuable houses.
Second, the consumer’s decision whether or not to buy insurance can be viewed as a choice between
a certain amount and a lottery. Since the publication of Schlesinger and Venezian’s original work and
following the seminal contribution on prospect theory by Kaheman and Tversky (1979), evidence
has accumulated showing that expected utility theory may not adequately describe people’s attitudes
towards risky choices (Rabin, 2000). Prospect theory assumes that people have reference-dependent
preferences: when faced with a risky decision, their decision is not solely based on the implications
for their absolute wealth level but on the change in wealth compared to a reference level. A second
key tenet of prospect theory is loss aversion: in evaluating risks, people attach greater weight to
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potential losses than to equivalent gains. A natural next step is to study the implications of prospect
theory for firm behavior.5 We apply the reference-dependent utility model introduced by Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007) to extend our analysis of the insurer’s loss prevention activities to situations
where consumers have reference-dependent preferences. This approach is novel and complements
other contributions that study the implications of the Ko˝szegi-Rabin framework on firm strategy
and competition in non-insurance markets (Heidhues and Ko˝szegi, 2008, 2010; Carbajal and Ely,
2013). Models of loss aversion have also been applied in the field of insurance, but most of these
contributions focus on the household’s decision-making problem rather than on the implications for
the optimal strategy for insurance companies (Hu and Scott ,2007; Sydnor, 2010, and Barseghyan et
al.,2013).6
Our main result is that for level of risk aversion commonly found in the literature, both the
expected utility specifications and the prospect theory models yield profit-maximizing loss probabilities
of around one half. This value is higher many of loss probabilities consumers face for everyday risks.7
The implication of this is that it is likely that an insurer with market power and unconstrained by
regulation and public opinion would find in its interest to raise the loss probability to the detriment
of consumers.
Our paper not only is an extension to the original work by Schlesinger and Venezian but can also
be viewed as a useful counterweight to other papers that conclude that consumers may benefit from
insurer market power. McKnight et al. (2012) for example find in a recent empirical study that
insurers pay less than the uninsured for certain health services and conclude from this that “market
power for insurers can offset provider market power. (p.10)” Our analysis shows that this conclusion
may be context-specific.
2 Expected utility framework
In this section, we deal with the optimal loss-size problem in the expected utility framework. We
assume that consumers are risk-averse with a twice differentiable utility function of final wealth W
with U
′
(·) > 0 and U ′′(·) < 0. The monopolistic insurer is risk-neutral. We follow Schlesinger and
Venezian (1986, 1990) and consider only full coverage insurance and assume complete information for
both parties. This allows us to abstract away from issues of deductibles, moral hazard and adverse
5As Barberis (2013, p. 188) notes: “When consumers have prospect theory preferences, firms may adopt a corre-
sponding strategy for price setting.”
6Barberis (2013) contains a summary of this literature.
7See for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_traffic-related_death_rate for a list
of traffic-related death rates for various countries.
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selection. Whereas they consider both the case where loss prevention activities can be bundled with
an insurance policy and the case where the insurers can alter the loss probability only before selling
insurance, we focus on the latter case.
Consider a monopolistic insurance market where consumers have an wealth W and face a wealth
prospect W − x where W is the present value of lifetime income and x a binary random variable that
takes the value L with probability p and 0 otherwise. A key element in our model is that the insurer
has the ability to costlessly change p. Consumer i will buy insurance if and only if:
Ui(W −R) ≥ (1− p)Ui(W ) + pUi(W − L), (1)
with R denoting the premium.8 The insurer’s decision problem is to set the premium R and the loss
probability p at values that maximize the insurer’s expected profits:
pi(p) = (R− pL)
N∑
i=1
I[Ui(W −R) ≥ (1− p)Ui(W ) + pUi(W − L)], (2)
where N denotes population size and I[·] an indicator function. The first term denotes the expected
profit per insuree and the summation gives the aggregate demand for insurance. Schlesinger and
Venezian (1986, 1990) focus on the case where consumers have identical risk preferences, that is,
Ui(·) = U(·). In this case, demand for insurance is either N or 0 for any (R, p)-combination. For
any given p, a profit-maximizing insurer will set the price of the policy R(p) such that U(W − R) =
(1− p)U(W ) + pU(W − L). That is
R(p) = W − U−1[U(W )− p(U(W )− U(W − L))] = W − CE(p), (3)
with CE(p) denoting the certainty equivalent to the wealth prospect W − x. This price equals the
actuarial value of the policy, pL (i.e. the expected loss), plus a fixed fee equal to the consumer’s risk
premium.9
For this general setup, Schlesinger and Venezian show that for any loss size L < W , there exists
a unique loss probability p∗ that maximizes the insurer’s expected profit. This situation is illustrated
in Figure 1. p = p∗ maximizes the horizontal distance between the certainty equivalent (CE(p)) and
the wealth prospect W − x. If this optimal probability p∗ is smaller than the status-quo probability
p0 in the market, the monopolistic insurer has incentives to invest in loss prevention activities. In a
8We assume that when consumers are indifferent between taking insurance or not, they choose to insure.
9For concave utility functions it follows from Jensen’s inequality that U(W − pL) ≥ pU(W −L) + (1− p)U(W ) which
is equivalent to W − pL ≥ U−1[pU(W − L) + (1 − p)U(W )] because of U ′ > 0. Thus R(p) = W − U−1[pU(W − L) +
(1− p)U(W )] ≥ pL. That is, for any p, R(p) is such that the insurer’s expected profits R(p)− pL are non-negative.
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perfectly competitive market, insurers do not have an incentive to engage in loss prevention, because
any increase in margin due to these activities will be competed away. Whether consumers are better
off in a monopolistic or a competitive market depends on whether any reduction in loss probability
compensates for the policy being priced above its actuarial value in the monopoly market.
Figure 1: The expected profit maximizing loss probability p∗.
2.1 Absolute risks
Schlesinger and Venezian (1990) present a quantitative analysis of their model. Their setting can be
thought of as one where consumers have to choose between a lottery of the form l = p◦−L⊕ (1−p)◦0
or avoiding the lottery by paying R(p). That is, consumers go uninsured against the risk to lose of
an absolute sum L with probability p or they buy insurance. They assume a representative consumer
with preferences that exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA):
U(W ) = 1− e−θW (4)
with θ > 0 the level of risk aversion. CARA preferences makes the decision to insure independent of
a consumer’s initial wealth level W .
For convenience, we repeat the main results. They show that (p. 88), for a given loss size L, the





eθL − 1 (5)
The critical probability pc which makes consumers as well off in a monopolistic market as in a com-
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petitive market equals
pc ≡ p∗ + (R(p∗)− p∗L)/L. (6)
Note that pcL = R(p∗). The term on the left hand side is the actuarially fair price consumers pay
for coverage in a competitive market with loss probability pc, the right hand side the monopolistically
priced policy with loss probability p∗. Figure 2 depicts the optimal and critical loss probabilities for
different loss sizes L. The left panel shows that the optimal probability is decreasing in the potential





p∗(θ) = 1/2, lim
L→∞
p∗(θ) = 0 (θ > 0).
Proof: All proofs are in the Appendix.
Figure 2: Plots of p∗(θ) (left panel) and pc(θ) (right panel) under different calibrations of L =
20, 40, 60, 80 and 100 for θ ∈ [0.01, 0.99].
This means that, independent of the consumers level of risk aversion, the insurer has an interest
in pushing down the status-quo loss probability as long as the loss L is sufficiently large, as for, say,
hospital expenses; for small losses, the insurer has an incentive to inflate the status-quo loss probability
to the detriment of consumers, unless one believes that the status-quo loss probability exceeds 0.5.
Although hard evidence is absent, we do observe that insurance against small losses is often offered
at a high price compared to the coverage. This implies that anyone who buys such policies is either
extremely risk averse or perceives the loss as highly likely to happen to him or her.10
10For example, a two-year insurance that covers breakage of prescription glasses with a value up to £100 costs £9
(http://www.visionexpress.com/glasses/buyers-guide/breakage-protection/).
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The left panel of Figure 2 shows that for given L, the optimal loss probability is decreasing in
θ. This is because in selecting the loss probability, the insurer has to trade-off the negative effect
of decreasing p on consumers’ willingness to pay (insuring against a loss is more valuable the higher
the expected loss) against the positive impact a lower loss probability has on the fraction of clients
suffering an actual loss (which reduces the insurer’s cost). For CARA utility and a given loss L, when
society becomes more risk-averse the second effect dominates, such that the insurer lowers p when
people become more risk-averse.
The right panel of Figure 2 shows the critical loss probabilities for different loss sizes L. Note
that for all values of L and θ, the status-quo probability has to exceed 0.5 for consumers to be better
off in a monopoly market. In most cases it has to be higher than 0.7. For example, for θ = 0.3
and L = 40, pc ≈ 0.79 and p∗ ≈ 0.08. Why are consumers not better off in a monopoly market
despite the impressive reduction in loss probability? The reason is that the monopolistic insurer sets
the price of the policy equal to the price that would be obtained under competition with the higher
loss probability: R(0.08) = pcL ≈ 31.7. Figure 3 illustrates this point by showing the ratio between
the actual price of the policy R(p∗) and its actuarial value p∗L. For L = 5 the risk premium seems
reasonable, but as L increases, consumers are willing to pay a premium dozens of times the actuarial
value, which implies absurdly high degree of risk aversion. This result is a direct consequence of the
observation first made by Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler (2001) that under CARA utility, the
refusal of small bet implies absurd levels of risk aversion for large bets. In sum, when consumers are
endowed with CARA preferences, the instances where they are better off in a monopolistic than a
competitive insurance market seem to be fairly few.
Figure 3: Plot of the R(p∗)/(p∗L) ratio for the loss sizes L = 20, 40, 60, 80, 95 and 100 and initial
wealth W = 100.
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2.2 Proportional risks
We next extend the analysis to the case where consumer preferences are characterized by constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA). CRRA models are more common than CARA in the recent literature
of insurance markets.11 CRRA utility is given by
U(W ) =
{
W 1−θ/(1− θ) for θ 6= 1,
lnW for θ = 1.
(7)
Since offering insurance is only profitable if there are risk-averse individuals, we limit attention to
the case θ > 0, ruling out situations where θ = 0 (risk-neutrality) or θ < 0 (risk-seeking).
By inserting (7) into the profit function (2) and taking the derivative with respect to p, we obtain
the following general expression for the profit-maximizing loss probability as a function of the risk
aversion parameter θ12:
p∗(θ) =




W 1−θ − (W − L)1−θ . (8)
In the remainder of this section, we focus on the situation in which consumers face a loss propor-
tional to their initial or discounted lifetime wealth, L = δW . In other words, they face a lottery of
the form l = p ◦ −δW ⊕ (1 − p) ◦ 0. This seems an appropriate description for decisions concerning
e.g. home insurance. With potential losses proportional to wealth, the optimal probability becomes










B−1 with B = 1− (1− δ)1−θ. (9)






11Just to mention some recent examples, Barseghyan et al. (2013), Sydnor (2010), Kaplan and Violante (2010) and
Brown and Finkelstein (2008) have all applied CRRA utility to describe risk aversion and insurance choice.
12Insert (7) and (3) into profit function (2), taking first-order condition and we arrive at
pi(p) = R(p)− pL = W − CE(p)− pL = W − U−1[U(W )− p(U(W )− U(W − L))]− pL
= W − (W 1−θ − p(W 1−θ − (W − L)1−θ)) 11−θ − pL;
pi′(p) = − 1
1− θ (W
1−θ − p(W 1−θ − (W − L)1−θ)) 11−θ−1(−W 1−θ + (W − L)1−θ)− L = 0
⇒ (W 1−θ − p(W 1−θ − (W − L)1−θ)) 11−θ−1 = L(1− θ)
W 1−θ − (W − L)1−θ
⇒ p∗ =




W 1−θ − (W − L)1−θ .
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2. p∗(1/2) = 1/2,
3. limδ→1 p∗(θ) = 1− (1− θ) 1−θθ ,
4. limδ→0 p∗(θ) = 1/2.
It is most insightful to discuss the implications of these properties together with the graphs in Figure 4
that show the development of the optimal and critical loss probabilities for different values of θ and δ.13
Again, as for CARA utility, we observe that the optimal p is decreasing with the level of risk-aversion
among the population. The right panel of Figure 4 shows that for all sizes of the potential loss and all
levels of risk aversion, the status-quo probability has to exceed 0.5 for consumers to be better off in
a monopoly market. Again, the instances where consumers are better off in a monopolistic insurance
market seem to be few.
The left panel of Figure 4 and Result 2 show that for values of the risk aversion parameter θ ≤ 1/2,
p∗(θ) ≥ 1/2 ∀δ. That is, a monopolistic insurer will not have any incentive whatsoever to push loss
probabilities below 0.5 if consumers are only mildly risk averse. Moreover, according to property 4, the
optimal loss probability is 0.5 for any level of risk aversion in the limiting case δ ↓ 0. The figure shows
that only in case of δ ≥ 0.95 and high levels of risk aversion, the optimal loss probability drops to values
importantly lower than 0.5. The reason is that in this case, a lowering of the loss probability only has
a very limited impact on the price the insurer can charge while significantly reducing the expected
cost. Wakker (2008) mentions that when large amounts of money are at stake, utility functions with
θ > 1 tend to best fit empirical data, such that the combination of high-δ/high-θ may not be that rare
in practice, see also Hartley et al. (2013).
The right panel of Figure 4 shows that, as in the CARA case, for any level of risk aversion and loss
size, the status-quo probability has to exceed 0.5 for consumers to be better off in a monopoly market.
The instances that give the insurer the strongest incentives to reduce the loss probability are exactly
those for which the status-quo probability has to be very high in order for consumers to benefit from
being in a monopolistic instead of a competitive market. So also for CRRA utility, we conclude that
consumers are better off in a monopolistic insurance market only when the potential loss is close to
one’s initial wealth and consumers have a high index of relative risk aversion.
13We would like to point out that, other than ease of exposition, there no reason to neglect values of θ > 1 (see Wakker
(2008, p. 1330-1332)).
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Figure 4: Plots of p∗(θ) (left panel) and pc(θ) (right panel) for δ = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.95 and 1.
2.2.1 Heterogeneous risk attitudes
So far, we have assumed representative consumers. Insurers however operate in markets where con-
sumers differ in their risk attitudes and for this reason, we now lift the assumption to see whether how
this will affect our results.14 Since there is no closed form solution for p∗(θ) in this case, we revert to
simulation and present numerical results.
In line with Holt and Laury (2002), who estimate the coefficient of risk aversion for most subjects
in a laboratory experiment to be in the 0.3 − 0.5 range, we draw individual risk preferences θi from
the distribution N(0.4, 0.1). To find the distribution of profit maximizing (R(p∗), p∗)-combinations
for a given proportional loss δ, we follow a three-step procedure: First we generate a total of N =
1000 consumers (θ1, θ2, . . . , θ1000), with θj independent draws from N(0.4, 0.1). Each consumer has
initial wealth fixed at W = 100. Second we determine for each given loss probability p the optimal
premium by calculating the quantity sold and profits obtained for each possible value of the premium
R ∈ [pL : 0.01 : W ]; we then repeat this step for each probability p ∈ {0, 0.01, . . . 1.00} and select the
probability p∗ for which pi(p∗, R(p∗)) ≥ pi(p′, R(p′)), ∀p′ ∈ [0 : 0.01 : 1]. We repeat these three steps
T = 1000 times in order to arrive at distributions of the optimal p∗ and other market characteristics
such that the percentage of consumers that takes out insurance and consumer welfare.
Table 1 gives the simulation results for different values of δ. The table shows that, similar to the
homogeneous CRRA case with θ < 0.5, the optimal loss probability is increasing in δ but close to
one half for all values of δ considered. The equilibrium fraction of consumers insured is very similar
for different values of δ. Figure 5 shows for δ = 0.2 the simulated distributions of the optimal loss
14We assume that the insurer only knows the distribution f(θ) of θ such that he cannot engage in first-degree price
discrimination.
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probability p∗, the insurer’s profits, the premium R(p∗) set and the number of consumers that decides
to buy insurance.
Loss size Probability Premium Profit Percentage
(δ) p∗ s.e. R s.e. pi(p∗) s.e. insured s.e.
0.01 0.490 (0.00) 0.49 (0.01) 0.30 (0.00) 79.13 (1.30)
0.05 0.490 (0.01) 2.46 (0.04) 8.10 (0.12) 81.02 (1.24)
0.10 0.491 (0.01) 4.95 (0.09) 33.30 (0.48) 83.16 (1.19)
0.20 0.493 (0.01) 10.03 (0.15) 141.10 (2.06) 81.86 (2.61)
0.40 0.500 (0.01) 20.78 (0.32) 644.30 (9.35) 82.08 (2.45)
0.60 0.504 (0.01) 32.32 (0.47) 1704.40 (24.63) 81.75 (2.53)
0.80 0.518 (0.01) 46.14 (0.44) 3842.50 (56.31) 81.79 (2.54)
0.90 0.528 (0.00) 54.66 (0.43) 5820.40 (86.24) 81.47 (2.53)
0.99 0.550 (0.01) 66.48 (0.54) 9668.00 (150.09) 80.26 (2.63)
Table 1: The simulation results for CRRA utility with θ ∼ N(0.4, 0.1). Standard errors in parentheses.
(a) p∗ (b) pi(p∗)
(c) R(p∗) (d) Quantity
Figure 5: Normal Kernel density estimations and scatter plots for the simulation results (δ = 0.2)
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3 Reference-dependent utility
In the expected-utility model, recent changes in wealth do not affect the utility one derives from one’s
current wealth. That is, a wealth level of $2 million gives you the same utility independent of whether
you gained $1 million or lost $3 million compared to yesterday. Rabin (2000) has shown that this
limited framework is unable to explain risk aversion over relatively small stakes because anything
but virtually risk neutrality over small stakes will implies absurd risk aversion over larger stakes.
Based on this, Rabin and Thaler (2001) conclude that economists should abandon the expected-utility
hypothesis.
Samuelson (2005, p. 90) notes that although this is the common way expected utility appears
in theoretical models, there are no fundamental objections to defining utility over initial wealth and
changes in wealth. Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) develop such a model of reference-dependent
utility in which the utility derived from a riskless wealth outcome consists of two components: a
- traditional - intrinsic “consumption utility” that is a function of the wealth outcome only, plus a
reference-dependent gain-loss utility. Subsequent studies have applied this model to topics as disparate
as cross-country differences in trust levels (Bohnet et al., 2010), a monopolistic firm’s pricing strategies
when consumers have reference-dependent preferences (Heidhues and Ko˝szegi, 2010; Carbajal and Ely,
2013), price variation and competition intensity (Heidhues and Ko˝szegi, 2008) and dynamic models
of consumption plans (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2009).
This section analyzes the behavior of a profit-maximizing insurer who can influence loss probabil-
ities in the reference-dependent utility framework. Our objective is to see whether the main finding
of the previous section – the profit-maximizing loss probability is around 0.5 for commonly observed
levels of risk aversion – is upheld in this context. To this end, we first present the Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2007) model.15
The key element of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) is that a person’s utility not only depends on her
riskless wealth outcome w ∈ R, but also on a riskless reference level of wealth r ∈ R.16 A representative
consumer’s total utility is given by
u(w|r) ≡ m(w) + µ(m(w)−m(r)), (10)
15Sydnor (2010, Section F) contains a nice discussion how standard prospect theory cannot fully explain insurance
purchases, but newer models such as Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), can.
16The difference between the models introduced in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) and Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) is that
utility in the latter depends on a multi-dimensional consumption bundle and reference bundle. We follow Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2007), which uses a version with a one-dimensional utility function.
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with the term m(w) the intrinsic consumption utility and the term µ(m(w) − m(r)) the reference-
dependent gain-loss utility. The model assumes that the reference point r relative to which a consumer
evaluates an outcome is stochastic because a consumer may be uncertain about outcomes. When w




The model makes the simplifying assumption that preferences are linear in probabilities: For a
given reference point, the stochastic wealth outcome is evaluated according to its expected reference-
dependent utility. This in contrast to prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Barberis, 2013)
that allows decision weights to be a non-linear function of the objective probabilities in order to accom-
modate the commonly observed phenomenon that people tend to overweigh small probabilities and
underweigh large probabilities.17 Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) make five assumptions on the properties
of the gain-loss utility µ(·) of which we repeat for convenience assumption A2 (capturing loss aversion
for large stakes) and A3 (diminishing sensitivity):
A2 If y > x > 0, then µ(y) + µ(−y) < µ(x) + µ(−x).
A3 µ′′(x) ≤ 0 for x > 0 and µ′′(x) ≥ 0 for x < 0.
In our analysis, we will use the same parametrization as Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007): µ(x) = ηx
for x > 0, and µ(x) = ηλx for x ≤ 0. In this parametrization, η > 0 is the weight that consumers
attach to gain-loss utility, and λ > 1 is their coefficient of loss aversion. As in the previous section,
consumers have to decide whether they wish to face the risk of losing L of their initial wealth W with
probability p or to buy insurance against this risk by paying a premium R. Again, we assume that
people choose to buy insurance as long as the expected utility of being insured is at least equal to the
expected utility of staying uninsured.
To close the model, one needs to determine the appropriate reference point. Although there is little
empirical evidence on the determinants of reference points, Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) make the
case for a rational expectations assumption: A person’s reference point has to be consistent with the
beliefs about the outcome this person held in the recent past. For example, an employee who had
been expecting a salary of $100,000 and should assess a salary of $90,000 not as a gain but as a loss.18
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) consider three attitudes towards risk and give an example for L = 100,
17This simplification may lead us to underestimate the demand for insurance for low-probability losses.
18Their main reasons for assuming rational expectations are that it maintains modeling discipline and that there is
empirical evidence indicating that reference points are influenced by expectations (Post et al., 2008).
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p = 0.5 and R = 55. First they look at unanticipated risks, where the agent’s reference point is fixed.
An agent for example expects to retain the status quo of 0. In this case, buying insurance will inflict a
sure loss of 55 whereas the no-insurance option gives a 50% chance to lose 100. Due to the diminishing
sensitivity assumption, the agent will not buy insurance. For the context we consider however, the
instances where agents do anticipate the exposure to risk seem more appropriate. In these situations,
the agent correctly predicts the choice set she faces. Within this class, Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007)
distinguish between UPE/PPE risk attitudes and CPE risk attitudes.
In the unacclimating personal equilibrium (UPE), the time between the decision (take insurance
or not) and the outcome (a loss occurs or not) is sufficiently short that the agent does not adapt her
expectations. That is, she will evaluate the gain-loss utility of the outcome relative to the expected
outcome without coverage, and the agent knows she will evaluate outcomes this way (the rational
expectations assumption). Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) mention as examples, insurance choice for short-
term rentals such as cars and skis. In terms of the earlier example, in deciding whether or not to take
insurance, she will infer that
a taking insurance by paying 55 will induce a either feeling of losing 55 with probability 1−p = 0.5
(in case no loss occurs) or a feeling of gaining 45 (in case a loss does occur);
b not taking insurance will either lead to a mixed feeling of status quo and gaining 100 (in case
no loss occurs) or a mixed feeling of status quo and loosing 100 (in case a loss does occur).
In the choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE), it is assumed that the time between the moment
of deciding and the moment of the outcome is sufficiently long to adapt expectations. That is, if the
agent decides not to take insurance, this choice will determine her reference point at the time the
relevant wealth outcome occurs and the possibility that she could have taken insurance does not enter
the gain-loss calculation.19 If she decides to take insurance, this will determine her reference point
and the possibility that she could have chosen not to insure does not enter the gain-loss calculation.
This situation adequately describe choice for travel and flight insurance. To return to the Ko˝szegi and
Rabin example, the agent will rightly infer that
a taking insurance by paying 55 will not lead to any gain-loss utility because at the moment of
the outcome, the risk that was once there will be forgotten;
19Phrased a bit differently, the CPE is defined as the decision that maximizes expected utility given that it determines
both the reference lottery and the outcome lottery. (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2007).
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b not taking insurance will, just as in the UPE situation either lead to a mixed feeling of status
quo and gaining 100 (in case no loss occurs) or a mixed feeling of status quo and loosing 100 (in
case a loss does happen).
So, compared to UPE, taking insurance will be more attractive in a CPE context because it is never
felt as a loss. The implication of the insurance being relatively more attractive is that agents are more
risk averse when they anticipate a risk and the possibility buy insurance coverage. We now continue
with calculating the optimal loss probabilities under UPE and CPE.
3.1 Optimal loss probability under UPE risk attitudes
In the remainder of this section, we assume that the consumption utility is linear, m(w) = w. This is
a reasonable assumption for modest scale risks. If being insured is the reference point, the expected
utility of a consumer with initial endowment W who decides to buy insurance by paying a premium
R equals
U(F |F ) =
∑∑
u(w|r)f(w)f(r)drdw
= f(W −R)f(W −R)[m(W −R) + µ(m(W −R)−m(W −R))] (12)
= m(W −R),
where the last equality follows because i) in case of being covered, there is no uncertainty in the final
wealth received, f(W −R) = 1; ii) if being insured is the reference point, the probability measure of
the reference point has mass 1 at W −R as well. There is no feeling of loss or gaining in this case.
If being insured is the reference point but the consumer decides not to buy insurance, her the
expected utility is:
U(F ′|F ) =
∑∑
u(w|r)f ′(w)f(r)drdw
= f ′(W − 0)f(W −R)[m(W ) + µ(m(W )−m(W −R))]
+ f ′(W − L)f(W −R)[m(W − L) + µ(m(W − L)−m(W −R))] (13)
= (1− p)[m(W ) + µ(m(W )−m(W −R))] + p[m(W − L) + µ(m(W − L)−m(W −R))],
where the last equality follows from f ′(W−L) = 1−f ′(W ) = p and f(W−R) = 1: without insurance,
the wealth outcome is W −L with probability p and (W −L) otherwise; the reference point is (W −R)
with probability 1. Applying Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2007) definition, the decision to buy insurance is
an UPE if U(F |F ) ≥ U(F ′|F ).
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Assuming that consumers will buy insurance whenever the expected utility of being insured is at
least as large as the expected utility of not being insured, a risk-neutral monopolistic insurer who aims
to maximize expected profits will set the loss probability p such that R− pL is maximal, conditional
on U(F |F ) ≥ U(F ′|F ). In order to find an explicit solution for p∗, we use the same parametrization
of the reference-dependent gain-loss utility µ(·) as Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007): µ(x) = ηx for
x > 0, and µ(x) = ηλx for x ≤ 0, with η > 0 the relative weight that consumers attach to gain-loss
utility, and λ > 1 the coefficient of loss aversion. Given this specification:
U(F |F ) ≥ U(F ′|F )⇔W −R ≥ (1− p)[W + ηR] + p[W − L− λη(L−R)]
⇔W −R ≥W + (1− p)ηR− pL− pλη(L−R).
We arrive at the following result (a detailed derivation is provided in Appendix A.3):
Result 3. In an economy where consumers’ attitude towards risk is characterized by UPE, the loss
probability p∗ that maximizes the expected-profits of a monopolistic insurer equals
p∗ =
√
(1 + λη)(1 + η)− η − 1
η(λ− 1) , (14)




(1 + λη)(1 + η)− η − 1)





One easily sees λ > 1 guarantees positive expected profits per insuree, R(p∗)−p∗L. Note that, different
from the expected-utility framework, the loss size L does not appear as an argument. A number of
other properties of p∗ are stated in the following corollary.




2. limη↓0 p∗ = 1/2.




The first property says that the optimal loss probability is decreasing with the relative importance








Empirical studies typically find estimates of the loss aversion parameter λ of around 2.25 (Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler, 1990; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Gill and Prowse, 2012). Such an estimate
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implies an lower bound for the optimal loss probability of 0.4. So, again, we find values of p∗ much
closer to 1/2 than to 0.
Another possible UPE is the situation where no insurance is the reference point and the decision
not to buy insurance gives the consumer a higher expected utility than buying insurance, that is:
U(F ′|F ′) ≥ U(F |F ′). Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) propose that in cases with multiple equilibria, an
individual will choose her “favorite” equilibrium, the one that gives the highest ex ante expected
utility if followed through. This leads to the concept of ‘preferred personal equilibrium’ (PPE) as an
equilibrium selection mechanism: the PPE is the most preferred UPE. In our case, deciding to buy
insurance is a PPE if U(F |F ) ≥ U(F ′|F ′). The assumption of profit-maximization by the insurer rules
out that U(F |F ) < U(F ′|F ′) because in that case, his profits would be zero and because – as we will
show in the next section – there is always a feasible loss probability p such that his expected profits
are non-negative and U(F |F ) ≥ U(F ′|F ′) holds.
3.2 Optimal loss probability under CPE risk attitudes
One of the implications of Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s model is that buying insurance is more attractive
when consumers have CPE instead of UPE risk attitudes. This implies that insurers are better off
when consumers can buy insurance well ahead of time. We explore this possibility in this section. The
expected utility of taking insurance U(F |F ) does not change and equals (12). The expected utility of
the decision not to buy insurance, given that the reference point is also “no insurance”, equals
U(F ′|F ′) =
∑∑
u(w|r)f ′(w)f ′(r)drdw
=f ′(W − 0)f ′(W − 0)[m(W − 0) + µ(m(W − 0)−m(W − 0))]
+ f ′(W − 0)f ′(W − L)[m(W − 0) + µ(m(W − 0)−m(W − L))]
+ f ′(W − L)f ′(W − 0)[m(W − L) + µ(m(W − L)−m(W − 0))]
+ f ′(W − L)f ′(W − L)[m(W − L) + µ(m(W − L)−m(W − L))]
=(1− p)2m(W ) + p2m(W − L)
+ p(1− p)[m(W ) +m(W − L) + µ(m(W )−m(W − L)) + µ(m(W − L)−m(W ))].
(16)
Without insurance, the wealth outcome is W with probability f ′(W ) = 1 − p and (W − L) with
probability f ′(W − L) = p. The reference point is ‘no insurance’ in which case likewise the outcome
is W with probability (1− p) and (W − L) otherwise.
Buying insurance is a choice-acclimating personal equilibrium if U(F |F ) ≥ U(F ′|F ′) for all F ′.
The difference between UPE and CPE is that in the latter case, the reference point adjusts to the
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decision. The monopolistic insurer sets p such that the expected profits are maximized under the
condition that U(F |F ) ≥ U(F ′|F ′). Equating U(F ′|F ′) in equation (16) to U(F |F ) in equation (12)
shows that in equilibrium, the expected profit margin of the insurer equals
R− pL = −p(1− p)[µ(L) + µ(−L)]
Since we know from assumption A3 that µ(+L) + µ(−L) < 0, expected profits are maximized when
p∗ = 1/2. We state this result formally:
Result 4. In an economy where consumers’ attitude towards risk is characterized by CPE, the loss
probability p∗ that maximizes the expected-profits of a monopolistic insurer equals 1/2.
Note that this result is reached without assuming any specific parametrization for the gain-loss utility
function. Figure 6 provides some intuition for this result. In the figure, the loss-averse utility function
U(F ′|F ′) of equation (16) is convex with respect to p.20 When p = p∗, an individual’s utility equals
U(p∗) if she is loss-averse and (W − p∗L) if risk-neutral. Since we assume linear consumption utility,
the certainty equivalent equals CE(p) = U(CE(p)). Thus the expected profit equals the distance
marked by the vertical dotted line. The optimal loss probability p∗ maximizes the distance between
U(F ′|F ′) and the expected wealth line W − pL, which is the point p where U ′(p) equals the slope
of the expected wealth line, which is −L. This maximal distance is attained when p∗ = 1/2 because
U ′(F ′|F ′) = −L+ (1− 2p)[µ(L) + µ(−L)].
20Because we assume linear consumption utility, plotting the wealth level at the horizontal axis, as in Schlesinger and
Venezian (1986, Figure 1) leads to linear utility curves. For this reason, we use the decision variable p as the variable at
the horizontal axis.
To show that U ′(F ′|F ′) is convex, take the first order and second order derivatives w.r.t. p:
U ′(F ′|F ′) = −2(1− p)W + 2p(W − L) + (1− 2p)[2W − L+ µ(L) + µ(−L)]
= −L+ (1− 2p)[µ(L) + µ(−L)];
U ′′(F ′|F ′) = −2[µ(L) + µ(−L)].
Because µ(L) > 0, µ(−L) < 0 and |µ(L)| < |µ(−L)|, U ′′(F ′|F ′) > 0 and thus U(F ′|F ′) is convex. When 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
2
,
U ′(F ′|F ′) < 0 for sure; when 1
2
< p ≤ 1, we have
U ′(F ′|F ′) = 0⇒ pˆ = 1
2
− L
2[µ(L) + µ(−L)] .
For 1
2
< p < pˆ, U ′(F ′|F ′) < 0; and for pˆ < p ≤ 1, U ′(F ′|F ′) > 0. The utility function first decreases in p and then




Figure 6: CPE risk attitudes and the risk premium with linear consumption utility.
For the specific parametrization µ(x) = ηx for x > 0 and µ(x) = ληx for x ≤ 0, the profit
maximizing premium and profits are equal to













The premium R∗ is increasing in the weight of the gain-loss utility in the utility function and in λ.
This means that, in line with intuition, an insurer can attain higher profits, the more an individual
weighs losses relative to gains.
Our result that p∗ = 1/2 when consumers have CPE risk attitudes is qualitatively similar to
the results for UPE risk attitudes and for the expected utility model. Compared to the UPE case,
individuals are more inclined to take out insurance because they are more risk-averse when they can
commit to the choice ahead of time. The model we discuss in this section only considers a representative
agent economy. Note however that for CPE risk attitudes, heterogeneity in either η or λ does not
change our result because p∗ does not depend on these values.
3.3 Numerical example
We conclude this section with a small numerical example. Assume that the consumer with a gain-loss
coefficient λ = 2.25 has to decide whether or not to insure against a risk that leads to a loss L = 10
with probability p∗. Table 2 compares for different values of η the expected-profit maximizing loss
probability p∗ and premium for the case where consumers have UPE risk attitudes with the case where
20
UPE CPE
η p∗ R(p∗) pi R(p
∗)
p∗L p
∗ R(p∗) pi R(p
∗)
p∗L
0.1 0.486549 5.13 0.27 1.06 0.5 5.31 0.31 1.06
0.5 0.456571 5.43 0.87 1.19 0.5 6.56 1.56 1.31
1 0.439608 5.60 1.21 1.27 0.5 8.13 3.13 1.63
5 0.411714 5.88 1.77 1.43 0.5 20.63 15.63 4.13
10 0.406235 5.94 1.88 1.46 0.5 36.25 31.25 7.25
50 0.401315 5.99 1.97 1.49 0.5 161.25 156.25 32.25
100 0.400662 5.99 1.99 1.50 0.5 317.50 312.50 63.50
Table 2: Numerical example of the optimal loss probability and premium when L = 10, λ = 2.25, and
consumers have either UPE or CPE risk attitudes.
they have CPE risk attitudes. The table also gives the expected profits per insuree and the ratio of
the premium charged (R(p∗)) and the actuarial value of the policy (p∗L).
In line with the analytical results, the numerical results show that as the gain-loss utility receives
higher weight, the optimal loss probability decreases in the UPE case. The premium and expected
profits are increasing in η, both for UPE as for CPE. Table 2 confirms that the monopolistic insurer is
able to attain higher expected profits when consumers have CPE preferences. This difference is very
sizable: whereas in the UPE case, the premium rises to about 1.5 times the actuarial value, it rises
to 63 times the actuarial value in the CPE case. This is reminiscent of our earlier findings for the
expected utility model were consumers were endowed with CARA preferences (see Figure 3).
4 Conclusions
This paper follows up on the original contributions by Schlesinger and Venezian (1986, 1990) who
first investigated the incentives for loss-modification by profit-maximizing insurers. They concluded
that granting insurers market power might benefit consumers because this might trigger them exert
efforts to bring down the ex ante loss or the probability with which such a loss occurs. In this original
work, the possibility of increases in the loss probability that would harm consumers receives relatively
little attention, because it is “likely to meet with public resistance and possible regulatory restraint.”
(Schlesinger and Venezian, 1990)
In this theory paper, we calculate for a number of settings the value of the profit-maximizing
loss probability with the idea that the higher this value, the less likely it is that the initial loss
probability is even higher and the less likely that consumers would be better off in an insurance
market with less competition. First we consider the expected-utility framework. We repeat the
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analysis in Schlesinger and Venezian (1990) for an economy in which consumers are endowed with
CARA preferences, which describes the case where consumers face absolute losses. Next we describe
the situation where consumers have CRRA preference, which describes situations where they have to
choose whether or not to insure against a potential loss proportional to their wealth. In both cases,
the optimal loss probabilities only come close to zero if consumers are highly risk averse (CARA) or
are highly risk averse and face the risk of losing a large fraction of their initial wealth (CRRA).
In the second part of the paper, we use the more recent loss aversion theory to analyze the in-
surer’s problem of finding the optimal loss probability in case the consumers have reference-dependent
preferences. We use the reference-dependent utility model developed by Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2006,
2007) to show that under the assumption of linear consumption utility, the optimal loss probability
is 0.5 when consumers have CPE risk attitudes and between 0.4 and 0.5 when consumers have UPE
risk attitudes and a gain-loss coefficient of 2.25, a value often found in empirical studies.
Our main conclusion therefore is that in most commonly used specifications, the loss probability
that maximizes a monopolistic insurer’s profits is closer to 1/2 than to 0, independent of whether
we adopt an expected-utility framework or take the perspective of loss-averse consumers. As a conse-
quence, the instances where consumers are better off in a monopolistic than in a competitive insurance
market seem to be fairly few. Our results culminate in the advice that one needs to be cautious to
bestow market power on insurers with the argument that this will incentivize them to engage in loss
reduction activities that will benefit consumers.
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A Appendix with proofs
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(1− θ)1/θ = 1− lim
θ→0
eln(1−θ)/θ
= 1− elimθ→0[ln(1−θ)/θ] = 1− elimθ→0(−1/(1−θ))/1 = 1− e−1,
where the second to last equality follows from application of L’Hoˆpital’s rule.
2. p∗(1/2) = 1/2.
Define A ≡W 1−θ − (W − L)1−θ. This allows one to rewrite equation (8) as





















W −√W − L)− L/2
2(W −√W√W − L− L/2) = 1/2. (A.3)
The second to last equality follows by noting that








W − L− L/2).
3. limδ→1 p∗(θ) = 1− (1− θ) 1−θθ .

















= 1− (1− θ)(1−θ)/θ. (A.4)
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Let f(δ) = (1− δ)1−θ and its Taylor series at point δ = 0 is:
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whereas X = [1 + θ2δ+
(1+θ)θ
6 δ
2 + . . . ] and limδ→0X = 1; and the result in step 4 is derived from step
3 by applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule.
A.3 Detailed solution for the insurer’s optimization problem under UPE
The constrained optimization problem for the monopolistic expected-profit maximizing insurer is:
max
p,R
pi = R− pL
s.t. (1− p)ηR+R− pL− pλη(L−R) ≤ 0.
The Lagrangian and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are the following:
L = R− pL− ξ [(1− p)ηR+R− pL− pλη(L−R)] ,
∂L
∂R
= 1− ξ [η − pη + 1 + pλη] = 0,
∂L
∂p
= −L− ξ [−ηR− L− ληL+ ληR] = 0,
ξ ≥ 0,
ξ [(1− p)ηR+R− pL− pλη(L−R)] = 0.
Case 1: The constraint is not binding and ξ = 0. However, this is not admissible because in that
case ∂L∂R = 1 6= 0.
Case 2: The constraint is binding. In this case the KKT conditions can be simplified to
1− ξ [η − pη + 1 + pλη] = 0,
− L− ξ [−ηR− L− ληL+ ληR] = 0,
(1− p)ηR+R− pL− pλη(L−R) = 0,
ξ > 0.
Solving these equations for p and R, one obtains:
p∗ =
√





(1 + λη)(1 + η)− η − 1)

















which is positive for λ > 1 and η, L > 0.
A.3.1 Proof of Corollary 1
A.4 Detailed solution for the insurer’s optimization problem under CPE
The constrained optimization problem for the monopolistic expected-profit maximizing insurer is:
max
p,R
pi = R− pL
s.t. (1− p)2W + p2(W − L) + p(1− p)[2W − L+ ηL− ληL]−W +R ≤ 0
The Lagrangian and the KKT conditions for this problem are the following:
L = R− pL− ξ((1− p)2W + p2(W − L) + p(1− p)[2W − L+ ηL− ληL]−W +R),
∂L
∂R
= 1− ξ = 0,
∂L
∂p




(1− p)2W + p2(W − L) + p(1− p)[2W − L+ ηL− ληL]−W +R] = 0.
Case 1: The constraint is not binding and ξ = 0. However, this is not admissible because in that
case ∂L∂R = 1 6= 0.
Case 2: The constraint is binding. In this case the KKT conditions can be simplified to
ξ = 1,
L− 2W + 2pW + 2pW − 2pL+ (1− 2p)(2W − L+ ηL− ληL) = 0,
(1− p)2W + p2(W − L) + p(1− p)[2W − L+ ηL− ληL]−W +R = 0.
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